How do we value what we value and how do we talk about it?

Socrates and Phaedrus?
Socrates with a Disciple and Diotima (?) painted approx. 1810 by Franc Kavčič.

One of the most famous descriptions of the task of philosophy occurs in Plato’s Phaedrus when Socrates tells his interlocutor that he does not have time to speculate about specialities because: “I am still unable, as the Delphic inscription orders, to know myself; and it really seems to me ridiculous to look into other things before I have understood that” (230a). The project of learning about oneself has been a basic program in philosophy in the almost 2500 years since Socrates’ death. However, the way in which Socrates pursues his philosophical program to ‘know thyself’ seems to me at least as important as his intention (that is to say, the form in which his philosophy is written). What is the form in which Socrates pursues self-knowledge? Dialogue. By why dialogue? How does the form of communication shape something’s philosophical content?

To get toward an answer I have three models of good philosophical form in mind that aren’t normally treated as philosophy: Michel de Montaigne’s Essays (published between 1572 and 1588); Robert Burton’s Anatomy of Melancholy (1621 – 1638; Fyodor Dostoevsky’s Writer’s Diary, (1773 – 1883 with a couple of breaks).

On the surface, what stands out about these three very different texts is there shared heterogeneity (diversity of parts). Montaigne’s Essays weave together a many-layered tapestry of citations from Ancient writers and early-modern stories, organized around a seemingly off-the-cuff theme with multiple layers of revisions; Burton’s Anatomy is a cavernous, labyrinthine mess of quotes and observations organized meticulously into partitions, sections, members, subsections, and various sub-sub-divisions; Dostoevsky’s Diary is a monthly periodical written as if the author were writing whatever came to mind–but in fact he carefully edited and organized thematically around fiction, non-fiction, semi-fiction, reporting, criticism, and autobiography.

Why describe these annoyingly opaque texts as ‘models of good form’? ‘Bad form’ would probably be something that contradicts its content by the way it is presented (an instance of bad form might be a story I heard once of a lecture given by a professor in which he told his students to think for themselves. The students immediately wrote down ‘think for myself’ in their lecture notes).

The philosophical concern that all three of these texts answer by way of their multitudinous forms is something along the lines of:

    1. If I interpret the world from a preconceived perspective and
    2. Learning means gaining a new understanding that I previously did not have,
    3. Then the acquisition of new knowledge requires taking on a genuinely new perspective, different from that which I commonly take to be my own.

Here is an example of this hypothesis from Dostoevsky’s Writer’s Diary:

The multitude of literary genres in the Diary allows Dostoevsky to communicate various, sometimes contrasting perspectives on topical issues to his readers and thereby circumvent his readers’ original beliefs. Gary Saul Morson frames this maneuver well in his introduction to Dostoevsky’s Diary: “Any ethical theory, not just the doctrine of the environment, will produce grotesque results when formulated as a universal law. Real moral judgment demands fine discrimination among apparently similar cases, and in such a process of judgment generalities play their proper role not as laws but as maxims, as reminders of earlier cases that may or may not be applicable to the one under consideration” (43). Dostoevsky’s communication in the Diary is often most effective in moments when he emphasizes the implicit judgments behind contemporary events. Dostoevsky presents the basis for judgment in evaluations which people make based upon their own deeply rooted ideas. In the 1873 article, “Environment,” he writes:

Some ideas exist that are unexpressed and unconscious but that simply are strongly felt; many such ideas are fused, as it were, with the human. They are present in the People generally, and in humanity taken as a whole. Only while these ideas lie unconscious in peasant life and are simply felt strongly and truly can the People live a vigorous “living life.” The whole energy of the life of the People consists in the striving to bring these hidden ideas to light (137).

Dostoevsky scholar Joseph Frank calls the principles Dostoevsky describes here “idea-feelings” and connects many of Dostoevsky’s most firmly held beliefs with their surfacing (for example, see Frank II 116). The main point of Dostoevsky’s article titled “Environment,” in which this concept appears, is to undermine the argument espoused by Dostoevsky’s contemporary liberals that a person’s environment voids their moral responsibility, if driven to crime because of difficult circumstances. On the contrary, Dostoevsky argues, the hidden life-ideas within people allow them to change their environment (Writer’s Diary, 138).

Perhaps one not-wrong way to phrase the philosophical idea undergirding the formal heterogeneity of the Essays, the Anatomy, and the Diary is to ask: how can we excavate these underlying ideas?

If the underlying ideas that fundamentally inform a person’s evaluations lie beneath the surface of their psyche, formed not only by that person’s memories and moral-cultural heritage but also by through the freedom of that person’s will, then the radical embodiment of a new perspective has a double meaning: learning as the process of  taking on a new perspective also allows access to the firmament of one’s own most deeply held beliefs.

Getting to the ground of these beliefs, perhaps digging beneath them, perhaps anchoring them, perhaps just learning how to anchor oneself in them, seems to me to be a way of response to Socrates’ program to ‘know thyself.’ The most common literary form in philosophy, indeed in academics as a whole, is the argumentative essay. The essay begins with the idea, the thesis, and creates a monologue around that single idea it is essentially homogeneous. The persuasive essay therefore eschews the multiplicity of perspective needed to gain knowledge of the idea-feelings undergirding one’s own values. It is not a very good form for learning. A heterogeneous form, on the other hand, brings many views together into one text. Plato seems to have had a similar belief and wrote exclusively dialogues. Burton, Montaigne, and Dostoevsky, too, seem to have intuited literary forms well-suited to inquiring into the psyche of the human being.


Works referenced:

Robert Burton. The Anatomy of Melancholy. Edited by Holbrook Jackson. New York: New York Review of Books, 2001.

Fyodor Dostoevsky. A Writer’s Diary, Volume 1. Translated by Kenneth Lantz. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1994.

Joseph Frank. Dostoevsky, The Years of Ordeal, 1850-1859. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983.

Michel de Montaigne. The Complete Essays of Montaigne. Translated by Donald M. Frame. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958.

Plato. Phaedrus in Plato: Complete Works. Edited by John M. Cooper. Translated by Alexander Nehamas and Paul Woodruff. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1997.

Richard’s ‘Fall from the Firmament’

220px-Richard_II_of_England

In last week’s NAP, I talked about carefully interpreting literature—especially not “falsifying through interpretations.” I did the opposite this week… In reading Joseph Frank’s biography of F.M. Dostoevsky, a major theme in Dostoevsky’s life that comes up throughout his work is the moral ill-effects of the Russian people’s loss of faith in Christianity due to the influence of European secularism. In virtually all of Dostoevsky’s novels published after Notes from the Underground (1862), religion as the foundation of morality functions as a dominant theme.

There is good reason to believe that the birth of secularism (a lack of belief in religion) coincided with the Enlightenment, in the 18th century (we’ll dive much more deeply into these historical developments when reading Charles Taylor’s A Secular Age in the next few weeks). The tension between the secular-amoral and religious moralities, however, made me think of Shakespeare’s Richard II. Preceding exactly as I suggested last week how not to read (guided by a preconceived interpretation), I reread Richard II with the thematic relationship between religion and morality in mind.

The argument I will make in this post is that William Shakespeare’s late 16th century history play Richard II dramatizes the loss of morality following political secularization. I found that Shakespeare thematizes the loss of political and social stability, which stems directly from the pragmatic-political character Bolingbroke’s trespass against King Richard II’s throne. The king as a symbol of the Christian God does seem to be a political belief very distant from current political concerns but I think that it is not commonly considered today just how closely the Christian basis of morality (the dissolution of which Shakespeare dramatizes in Richard II) affects the possibility of morality at all, at least as we usually understand it (as regarding good and bad behavior between human beings).

Shakespeare’s Richard II displays an idealistic faith in God’s support of his kingship. Henry Bolingbroke, the future Henry IV, who seizes the crown from Richard displays a pragmatic realism. Richard’s belief in the abstract validity of the right of the king comes to not match up to the reality of his political situation, as he loses power and Bolingbroke gains it. For instance, Richard’s statement that the “earth shall have a feeling and these stone/ Prove armed soldiers ere her native king/ Shall falter under foul rebellious arms” (Act 3, scene 2, lines 24-26) is an example of idealistic abstraction is opposite to Bolingbroke’s pragmatic skepticism (1.3.258). However, as the action of the play unfolds, Richard’s political weakness and Bolingbroke’s political strength flip, alongside the audience’s assessment of their moral character. The originally politically savvy Bolingbroke proves unable to fulfill the representative offices of the king. Richard, on the other hand, purges himself of his iniquities from the earlier sections of the play (the murder of his uncle and unjust taxations of the realm). As Richard is dethroned, he does exactly the right thing, morally speaking, whereas Bolingbroke sinks lower in the immoral consequences of his rebellion against the King. Richard immediately turns to renunciation of what is his as an act of penance, especially when he gives up the crown (4.1.233). Even the Queen is surprised by Richard’s “mildness;” he acts as if he has been physically killed (5.1.39). Richard, however, renounces his claim to earthly in return for religious salvation:

I am sworn brother, sweet,
To grim Necessity, and he and I
Will keep a league till death […]
Our holy lies must win a new world’s crown,
Which our profane hours here have stricken down
(5.1.20-25).

Richard foresees the particularly terrible sins that will be elicited by the end of the play as a result of the trespass of the religious-moral firmament: “murders, treasons, and detested sins” found in the ideological darkness rather than the light of the sun, the king (3.2.40).

Shakespeare shows his preference for the Christian morality of the wronged characters in the play (against Bolingbroke and the other politically powerful characters) in part by giving only wronged characters prophetic powers, reminiscent of the biblical prophets. There are three prophetic figures in the play:

  • Mowbray, who is banished, later to be sanctified by dying in Christian wars against the Turks;
  • The Queen, Richard’s wife, whose intuition is paradoxical to the empirical facts she knows, creating an accurate, prophetic “birth” of feeling;
  • Richard himself, who predicts Northumberland’s rebellion, which occurs in Shakespeare’s Henry IV plays (1.3.198-199, 2.2.62-66, and 5.1.55, respectively).

Beside the prophetic moments, further support for Shakespeare’s preference for the Christian morality of the wronged characters is in evidence in the parallels between Richard’s suffering and the passion narrative of Christ. As Richard gives up the throne he immediately begins to speak of the monastery (3.3.145; 5.1.20). Richard immediately gives up his crown at the call of ‘Necessity,’ though he is aptly performative, saying exactly the ‘right’ thing, whereas Bolingbroke can’t even say explicitly that he wishes Richard to give up the throne yet.

Richard himself is the first to compare his situation with that of Christ in the passion narrative (4.1.164). The crowd’s mistreatment echoes this parallel (5.2.5). Richard’s death  cements his comparison with Christ and the Christian morality of sacrifice. Richard deemphasizes his earthly life and suppresses his ego:

Whate’er I am,
Nor I nor any man that but man is
With nothing shall be pleased, till he be eased
With being nothing (5.5.38-40).

Richard’s dying words emphasize the rising of his soul and lowering of his body, reassertion of the divine right that has been taken throughout the play by human folly: “Mount, mount, my soul! Thy seat is up on high,/ Whilst my gross flesh sinks downward here to die (5.5.111-112).”

In contrast, Bolingbroke’s trespass is brought to its logical end in royal murder and treason. Bolingbroke ascension contrary to the normative order of kingship throws morality and natural generation (both in terms of landed heredity and familial ties) into confusion. Bolingbroke himself draws an evil biblical parallel between Bolingbroke’s transgression and the narrative of Cain. Bolingbroke tells Exton (who murdered Richard): “With Cain go wander through the shade of night/ And never show thy head by day nor light (5.6.43-44).” Bolingbroke ends on a note of regret rather than Richard’s Christian forgiveness and even emphasizes his separation from the generative forces of life because of his moral trespass: “Lords, I protest my soul is full of woe/ That blood should sprinkle me to make me grow (5.5.45-46).”

Indeed, the natural loss of moral order is much like an unavoidable natural disaster. Richard’s woe is an event of natural proportions akin to a disaster:

Ah, Richard! With eyes of heavy mind
I see thy glory like a shooting star
Fall to the base earth from the firmament (2.4.18-20).

When Richard is split from his wife, he highlights the double transgression at work here:

Doubly divorced! Bad men, ye violate
A twofold marriage: twixt my crown and me,
And then betwixt me and my married wife (5.1.71-73).

The impossibility of natural filial and romantic relationships comes to the fore in the last act of the play, especially in Act 5, scene 2, when York discovers the treachery of his son, Aumerle, against Bolingbroke and leads into the moral darkness of the approaching wars, which Shakespeare dramatizes in further plays.

Shakespeare dramatizes the conflict between secular, realistic wisdom, as represented in Richard II by Bolingbroke and the religious-moral vision of Christian renunciation represented by Richard, by showing the latter to be clearly morally superior. The moral-religious conflict that Shakespeare depicts in Richard II has not, however, died along with feudal political structures. For instance, in The Brothers Karamazov, Dostoevsky is concerned with much the same religious-moral conflicts depicted here by Shakespeare, though in relation to a kind of Nationalism that we would recognize as largely modern. Dostoevsky suggests that morality cannot survive without continually being connected to the taproot of religion. Some of Dostoevsky’s great works, Notes from the Underground, Crime and Punishment, and Demons dramatize the struggle between the radical Russian intelligentsia of the time and the inherent moral faith of the Russian peasantry (interestingly, Demons dramatizes the conflict between these viewpoints in different characters, like in Richard II while Notes and Crime and Punishment center the conflict within a single psyche). In The Idiot and Brothers Karamazov Dostoevsky depicts much more clearly the positive influences of morally upright characters.

In my next post, I’ll consider Dostoevsky’s Christian-nationalism as an evolution of the basic moral-religious conflict outline in Richard II.


Works Cited:

William Shakespeare. Richard II. In The Norton Shakespeare: Histories. Edited by Stephen Greenblatt, et. al. New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2016. 373-466.


This post was written with the help of music. If you would like to be an amateur philosopher as well, try listening to the albums In Our Nature by Jose Gonzalez or Seven Swans by Sufjan Stevens.